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The Techno-Neutrality Solution to
Navigating Insurance Coverage for Cyber
Losses
Erik S. Knutsen and Jeffrey W. Stempel*
ABSTRACT
Insurers currently constrict coverage for losses involving electronic
information in traditional insurance product lines. As a result, insurance
customers are driven to the brave new world of non-standardized
varieties of cyber-risk insurance policies. That world abounds with
coverage gaps as the market for cyber insurance sorts itself out. Until
that synchronization of coverage for cyber losses occurs, litigation is
bound to occur as the boundaries of coverage remain patchwork and
uncertain.
This article examines the degree to which cyber losses differ from
other insured losses. The cyber-loss insurance coverage jurisprudence
reveals a mishmash of principles and coverage terms that are largely
focused on the technology of the loss and not on the nature of the loss
insured. Unpredictable and unhelpful analogies have ensued, prompting a
highly inefficient coverage marketplace and resulting litigation
experience. This article also draws parallels with the market experience
of a number of now-commonplace insurance coverage products, like
commercial general liability policies, that also went through an initial
period of uncertainty. Lessons from those prior insurance experiences are
instructive as the wild world of cyber insurance stabilizes.
This article proposes that, to reduce the prevalence of insurance
coverage disputes about cyber losses, courts should jettison the "cyber"
loss differentiation altogether and instead focus on the nature of the
inherent risk insured against, as opposed to the risk's "cyber" quality.
Taking a technologically neutral stance-applying "techno-neutrality" to
insurance policy language-can act as a market stabilizer. This approach
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Nevada Las Vegas. Special thanks to Chris French and to the Penn State Law Review for
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is preferable to introducing new, untested insurance products or,
alternatively, risking arbitrary coverage gaps under traditional product
lines. The long-term, more commercially sensible solution is for insurers
to simply fold cyber-loss coverage into traditional coverage products and
not differentiate losses based on particular or peculiar property
characteristics.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Insurers currently constrict coverage ior losses involving electronic
information (hereinafter "cyber losses") in traditional insurance product
lines such as commercial general liability (CGL) and property insurance
policies. As a result, insurance customers (i.e., policyholders or
prospective policyholders) are driven to the brave new world of non-
standardized varieties of cyber-risk insurance policies. That world
abounds with coverage gaps as the market for cyber insurance sorts itself
out. Until that synchronization of coverage for cyber losses occurs,
litigation is bound to occur as the boundaries of coverage remain
patchwork and uncertain.
This article proposes that, until the market for cyber-loss coverage
stabilizes, the medium- to long-term solution for coverage disputes
among insurers and policyholders is to jettison the "cyber" loss
differentiation altogether and instead focus on the nature of the inherent
risk insured against, as opposed to the risk's inherent "cyber" quality.
Taking a technologically neutral stance, or applying "techno-neutrality"
to insurance policy language, may act as a greater market stabilizer than
introducing new, untested insurance products or, alternatively, risking
arbitrary coverage gaps under traditional product lines. The legal notions
of "property" and physicality are changing. No longer is a physical and
tangible component necessary to consider something "property."
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If one instead approached cyber losses in a technologically neutral
fashion and focused on traditional bedrock insurance principles of risk
and fortuity, the "cyber" nature of the loss becomes considerably less
important-perhaps even irrelevant. When cyber risk is treated more as
risk and less as cyber, coverage questions involving loss or liability can
be dealt with more cleanly and arguably less expensively through
avoidance of unnecessary or protracted litigation.
This article examines the degree to which cyber losses differ from
other insured losses. The cyber-loss insurance coverage jurisprudence
reveals a mishmash of principles and coverage terms' that are largely
focused on the technology of the loss and not on the nature of the loss
insured. Unpredictable and unhelpful analogies have ensued, prompting a
highly inefficient coverage marketplace and resulting litigation
experience. This article also draws parallels with the market experience
of a number of now-commonplace insurance coverage products, like
CGL policies, that also went through an initial period of uncertainty.
Lessons from those prior insurance experiences are instructive as the
wild world of cyber insurance stabilizes.
The long-term solution is for insurers to simply fold cyber-loss
coverage into traditional coverage products and not differentiate a loss
based on its particular or peculiar property characteristics. The focus
should be on the risk presented in the context of the policyholder's
ordinary operations rather than the corporeal characteristics of lost or
allegedly injured property.
The path to that long-term solution will undoubtedly follow the
same pattern as all the insurance industry's attempts to deal with past
"novel risks" at which insurers originally balked. That history starts with
adding to what was once mere fire insurance coverage, extends through
the bundling of many liability coverages into the CGL policy, and,
finally, culminates in the amalgamation of coverage modules governing
various aspects of modem business. This amalgamation of coverage
continued to now include not only physical injury to property of the
policyholder or third parties but also injury once regarded as intangible,
as well as injury or losses particular to modem or "high-tech" businesses
quite different from the smokestack factories that spawned industrial
insurance.
These insurance industry attempts to map out coverage for such
risks typically involved an initial period of coverage denial under
1. See, e.g., Robert H. Jerry, II & Michele L. Mekel, Cybercoverage for Cyber-
Risks: An Overview of Insurers' Responses to the Perils of E-Commerce, 8 CONN. INS.
L.J. 7, 9 (2001) ("[I]nsurers' responses to [cyber-loss coverage] have been anything but
uniform.").
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traditional policy language, as courts attempted to inefficiently analogize
to coverage issues in the past and differentiate based on largely arbitrary
qualities of new property, activity, or risk. Today we see this in the
disparate rulings surrounding coverage for cyber losses.
In the past, these episodes have resulted in new and varying
insurance products targeted at this specific "new" risk (as occurred, for
example, during the Year 2000, or "Y2K," perceived "crisis").2 The
speed with which the market responds may vary. But history suggests the
market will eventually respond and crystallize with acceptance of the
"new" risk, recognizing it as a "new normal," and that coverage for cyber
losses can indeed follow along the same lines as coverage for similar
risks that do not have the "cyber" quality to them.
This movement may start with the new cyber coverages showing up
as drop-down coverage, or endorsements, to attach to traditional
insurance product lines. However, we expect that those additions will
soon become permanent mainstays in most standard CGL, directors and
officers, and homeowners insurance policies. We wish this circuitous
route could be avoided but insurance, necessarily being a world anchored
in the study of past happenings, is difficult to move without actuarial
evidence on which to base innovation. That is why our short- to medium-
term solution is an interpretive framework, until such time that modem-
day insurance realizes that cyber losses are part of the modem world as
much as house fires or burglary.
Ultimately, however, the correct answer-for both policyholders
who want protection, arid insurers who want profit-is inclusion of
cyber-loss coverage in the basic property and liability policies purchased
by the bulk of businesses and consumers.
II. THE COVERAGE LANDSCAPE FOR CYBER LOSSES
The current coverage market for cyber losses is a patchwork
network of both traditional insurance products as well as new, cyber-
loss-specific insurance policies like network security policies or cyber-
insurance policies. A "cyber loss" refers to a loss or liability arising out
of the use of electronic equipment or electronically stored information.
Cyber losses include such things as cyber security breaches, data losses,
2. See generally Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Mixed Bag for Chicken Little: Analyzing
Year 2000 Claims and Insurance Coverage, 48 EMORY L.J. 169 (1999) (detailing the
remarkable wind-up that occurred in the insurance world immediately prior to the Year
2000 computer bug that never really materialized in the scope and scale of losses
expected).
3. Such as CGL policies and directors and officers liability policies. See, e.g., 2
JEFFREY W. STEMPEL & ERIK S. KNUTSEN, STEMPEL & KNUTSEN ON INSURANCE
COVERAGE § 23.04 (4th ed. 2016) (discussing the anatomy of cyber-risk insurance).
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infection with computer viruses,4 breaches of data privacy, unauthorized
access, release or publication of private electronic information,6 mis-
transfer of electronic funds,7 or losses due to computer mishaps,
malfunctions, or misuse.
A cyber loss could result in a first-party claim whereby a
policyholder claims under its own insurance policy for the losses it
suffered. Such claims typically include the cost of the property lost plus
business interruption and remediation costs. A cyber loss could also
result in a third-party liability claim whereby the conduct of the
policyholder triggers a lawsuit from a third party who alleges that the
policyholder's behavior caused a cyber loss for that third party.
There is no doubting the cost of cyber losses to policyholders or
third-party victims of a cyber loss. A simple data breach can cost a
policyholder millions of dollars to remediate.8 Banks and other large
institutions that deal in large volumes of customer data or with sensitive
financial or health data are especially susceptible to cyber losses
stemming not only from negligence but from cyber crime and fraud as
4. See, e.g., Eyeblaster, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 613 F.3d 797, 802-03 (8th Cir. 2010)
(applying Minnesota law to a case involving a customer infected by spyware from an
online advertising retailer).
5. See, e.g., Zurich Am. Ins. v. Sony Corp. of Am., Index No. 651982/2011, 2014
N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5141, at *1, *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 24, 2014) (discussing an insurance
coverage dispute for a data breach affecting customers of an online gaming network).
6. See, e.g., In re Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litig., No. 15-MD-02617-LHK, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70594, at *91-92 (N.D. Cal. May 27, 2016) (considering a case of
wrongful access at a health insurer that resulted in personal health information of 80
million customers being compromised); In re Zappos.com, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 3d 949, 951
(D. Nev. 2015) (examining a claim in which the personal information of 24 million
customers was accessed by computer hackers); Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 998
F. Supp. 2d 646, 650 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (discussing a situation in which personal customer
information was stolen from an insurance company's computer system), rev'd in part,
663 F. App'x 384 (6th Cir. 2016).
7. See, e.g., State Bank of Bellingham v. Banclnsure, Inc., No. 13-CV-0900, 2014
WL 4829184, at *2-3 (D. Minn. Sept. 29, 2014) (describing a case in which a hacker
gained access to a bank computer system through spain email and computer virus, and
the bank was duped into transferring funds to Poland), aff'd, 823 F.3d 456 (8th Cir.
2016).
8. See PONEMON INST., 2017 COST OF DATA BREACH STUDY 1 (2017), https://www-
01.ibm.com/common/ssi/cgi-bin/ssialias?htmlfid=SELO3130WWEN (noting that, in
2017, the average total cost of remediation efforts with respect to data security breaches
for financial institutions was $3.6 million per incident).
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well.9 Cyber attacks could even feasibly lead to physical injury to
property or persons. o
The insurance market for cyber losses is a patchwork market that is
highly-but imperfectly-segmented." It is patchwork because there are
both traditional insurance products and new cyber-specific insurance
products available on the market. The cyber-specific products may exist
as add-ons to presently existing coverage lines, in the form of
endorsements or drop-down coverage,12 or they may be independent,
stand-alone coverage products that may target only certain cyber losses.
The insurance market has been exploding with a variety of cyber-specific
products. Such products provide insurance coverage for losses such as
security breach expenses, electronic data remediation costs, business
interruption, and electronic and payment expenses.13
It is an imperfectly segmented market because what a traditional,
non-cyber-specific insurance policy excludes from coverage may or may
not be covered by an available cyber-specific policy on the market. For
example, the Insurance Services Office, Inc.'s (ISO) standard CGL
policy endorsement form excludes from coverage "data-related liability,"
which includes liability arising out of "loss of, loss of use.of, damage to,
corruption of, inability to access, or inability to manipulate electronic
data."1 4
In that same policy, "electronic data" is defined as "information,
facts or programs stored as or on, created or used on, or transmitted to or
from computer software, including systems and applications software,
hard or floppy disks, CD-ROMS, tapes, drives, cells, data processing
9. See PONEMON INST. & ACCENTURE, 2017 CosT OF CYBER CRIME STUDY: INSIGHT
ON THE SECURITY INVESTMENTS THAT MAKE A DIFFERENCE 20 (2017) (noting that the
average cost of cyber crime for large financial services companies in 2017 was $18.28
million).
10. See, e.g., Nicole Perlroth & Clifford Kraus, A Cyberattack in Saudi Arabia Had
a Deadly Goal. Experts Fear Another Try, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/15/technology/saudi-arabia-hacks-cyberattacks.html
(discussing how a hacking attempt of a petrochemical manufacturer appears to have
sought "to sabotage the firm's operations and trigger an explosion").
11. See Tom BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY 466-67 (2d ed. 2008) (noting that
the concept of market segmentation is prevalent in the insurance market, and insurers
divide insurance products based on certain grouped underwriting risks such as auto risks
for auto policies and commercial risks for commercial policies).
12. See, e.g., Doctors Direct Ins., Inc. v. Bochenek, 38 N.E.3d 116, 119 (Ill. App. Ct.
2015) (featuring a cyber claims endorsement on a professional liability policy).
13. 2 STEMPEL & KNUTSEN, supra note 3, § 23.04 (discussing the anatomy of cyber
risk insurance). The 2015 Cyber Risk Solutions form from ISO provides these, and other,
first-party coverages. INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., ISO CYBER RISK SOLUTIONS FORM z14181
(Mar. 2015).
14. INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY ENDORSEMENT FORM
CG 21 07 05 14, at 1 (2013).
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devices or any other media which are used with electronically controlled
equipment."15
Because of these broad definitions of electronic data excluded from
coverage, the wide variety of cyber-specific products on the market may
only fill some of the gaps left in this exclusion and may well provide
additional coverage unique to a CGL's traditional scope.16 This has
resulted in somewhat unpredictable and uncomfortable insurance
coverage gaps for cyber losses.
The cyber-insurance market has only recently developed, and often
has developed in direct response to the evolving continuum of cyber
losses. It is not a market that, at present, appears to be driven by perfect
symmetry with traditional insurance coverage for non-cyber losses. A
policyholder's coverage for cyber losses depends not only on what is
covered and excluded by his or her standard insurance products, but also
on what is covered and excluded by whatever cyber-specific insurance he
or she has purchased.
The landscape for cyber-loss insurance coverage has, therefore,
been tricky for policyholders and insurers to navigate. New products,
untested policy terms, and issues with how the coverage synchronizes
with traditional non-cyber-insurance products have plagued the
developing coverage jurisprudence. The result has been striking
inconsistencies among the cases and ballooning litigation as the cyber-
loss coverage landscape is tested by policyholders expecting coverage
for cyber losses.17
At the same time, inconsistencies and litigation have also been
fueled by courts' peculiar approaches to cyber losses in the context of
coverage litigation. In the cyber-loss sphere, courts have, for the most
part, been trapped in unhelpful analogies differentiating cyber losses
from losses that occur in the physical world. Rather than focusing on the
inherent nature of the loss and its place in the panoply of available
insurance coverage for cyber risks, courts instead become enraptured by
the technological differences between a cyber loss and its parallel in the
non-cyber world.
As will be shown below, those differences are often misleading and
lead to troubling, inconsistent coverage determinations that damage the
ultimate stability of the cyber-insurance market. This problem is
compounded by the rapid development of a segmented insurance market
15. Id.
16. Such as coverage for identity theft reparations, for example.
17. See Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, Strengthening Cybersecurity with Cyber
Insurance Markets and Better Risk Assessment, 102 MINN. L. REv. 191, 253 (2017)
(discussing the significant uptick in cyber-insurance litigation cases filed from 2011 to
2015).
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for cyber losses that is not consistent with the reasonable coverage
expectations of the modem policyholder.18
III. THE PHYSICAL-DIGITAL CONUNDRUM FOR CYBER LOSSES
Policyholder losses in the cyber world are no different in end result
than the traditional physical losses incurred due to negligence. A
policyholder facing breach-of-privacy cyber liability-whereby some
estimates put the cost of each compromised customer record at about
$140 of liability"-is surely in a better position than one facing claims
for groundwater pollution, adverse reactions to medicine, or injury or
damage from a toxic substance. But in extreme cases of such liability
exposure, insurers have reacted by excluding significant claims from
basic coverage through the asbestos exclusion and the pollution
20exclusion.
The question then becomes this: How different is cyber loss than the
types of risks-in terms of frequency and magnitude-that are already
bundled into the comprehensive property and liability insurance widely
sold throughout the industrialized world?
To be sure, because of the multiplying network power of the
Internet, the magnitude of the risk may be large. But is it any larger than
the magnitude that exists for manufactured products in wide distribution?
In many cases, the answer to that question is a resounding "not much."
Manufacturers process millions of credit card or other payment
transactions each day. If something goes wrong, third parties can lose
money. But these same manufacturers also produce tens of thousands of
products that may cause physical injury or even death.
Assessing underwriting issues in this manner leads to a simple
conclusion: None of these aspects are, at heart, issues about insurability
and coverage. Instead, they are issues about wise-insurer ex ante
underwriting: Did the premium charged match the scope of the risk
insured?
None of these issues involve serious over-arching moral hazard or
adverse selection issues that prompt questions about whether the loss was
18. See Amy R. Willis, Note, Business Insurance: First-Party Commercial Property
Insurance and the Physical Damage Requirement in a Computer-Dominated World, 37
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1003, 1022 (2010) (predicting that business insurance products will
become "wholly inadequate" to modem business needs as cyber losses become more
ubiquitous).
19. See PONEMON INST. & ACCENTURE, supra note 9, at 1.
20. See 2 STEMPEL & KNUTSEN, supra note 3, §§ 14.01, 14.07, 14.11 (describing the
evolution of the CGL form and the 1986 revision to the form that introduced broadly
worded exclusions for asbestos-related liability, government-mandated environmental
cleanup, and pollution).
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fortuitous and, thus, uninsurable. These losses are not certain to occur as
a result of the policyholder's behavior.
Thus, cyber losses are theoretically insurable as part of a
comprehensive insurance product. The proliferation of cyber-insurance
products and the policyholder's challenges in obtaining post-loss
coverage under those products can, to date, be explained by the insurance
industry riding the uncertainty wave as courts grapple with cyber loss
legal issues in policies with non-standard language and coverage
frameworks.
Cyber losses currently fit into four general categories of insured loss
that are typically covered in their non-cyber forms in traditional property
and general liability insurance products: property losses, losses due to
crime or fraud, liability for property losses to others, and liability for
privacy-related losses to others.
Each type of loss is typically excluded from coverage in its cyber
form under traditional products in two possible ways: either as not
meeting conditions for coverage as a "direct physical loss" to property
that is "tangible," 21 or, if covered, by then being an excluded loss caught
by an "electronic information" type of exclusion. The secondary market
for cyber-specific policies attempts to fill in the gaps, albeit in a
piecemeal kind of way.
Cyber-property losses include the loss of sensitive electronic data or
damage to computer equipment or software. If a large online retailer
loses its customer database of millions of people, such is an
incapacitating loss to the retailer. There is an inherent economic value to
these commercial data tools in that they are a capital asset to the retailer.
But the loss, in kind and even in degree, is not inherently different than if
a more traditional, paper-based retailer lost the information for all of its
customers when the customer rolodex burned up in an office fire. If the
paper goes up in smoke, the non-cyber loss leaves the policyholder in the
same place-without valuable customer data.22
21. The standard all-risks property policy provides coverage for "direct physical
loss" to property that is "tangible." See, e.g., Metro Brokers, Inc. v. Transp. Ins. Co., No.
1:12-CV-3010-ODE, 2013 WL 7117840, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 21, 2013) (providing an
example of a standard property coverage clause); see also Willis, supra note 18
(concluding that the "physical damage" grant of coverage in property insurance should be
interpreted in an expansive way to catch cyber losses).
22. See, e.g., Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Kearney, 180 U.S. 132, 135
(1901) (describing a situation in which business records were destroyed in a fire when a
fleeing policyholder forgot to place records in an iron safe as required by the policy, and
despite the breach of this warranty, coverage was granted); Harris v. Albrecht, 86 P.3d
728, 730 (Utah 2004) (detailing how a fire destroyed an architect's home office and
drawings valued at more than $1.1 million, and finding no coverage for the drawings
because the policy at issue contained an exclusion for business operated on the insured
property).
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The loss of the customer database is a loss of property that will
almost certainly result in business interruption losses of some kind until
the data is rebuilt. Additional property-related losses could also include
the cost to rebuild the database and the loss of the capital asset itself,
which has an inherent value. The cyber version of this loss just seems
more likely to occur than the office fire because it could happen due to a
computer virus, an incorrect keystroke by an employee, or some other
software failing. Additionally, that same loss could occur if the servers
backing up the customer data get burned up in a fire.
But-inconsistently in our view-traditional property insurance
would cover the paper loss as "direct physical loss" to "tangible"
property-and the resulting interruption, if business interruption
coverage were part of the policy-but likely would not cover the cyber
version of the loss, which would be caught under the "electronic
information" exclusion.2 3
For example, there was no coverage for corrupted computer data
claimed under the policyholder's CGL policy at issue in America Online,
Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co.24 In that case, the court found that
computer data was not "tangible property" and the loss was not caused
by the policyholder's faulty product because the computers were not
physically damaged in any fashion. The data was just corrupted and
rendered unusable. Yet, to the court, "tangible property" had to have
some physical substance that was apparent to the senses. 25
Contrast the America Online court's treatment of data with the loss
of custom programming at issue in a business interruption claim in
American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co. v. Ingram Micro, Inc.26
In American Guarantee, a power loss resulted in the policyholder losing
customer programming, which prevented the policyholder from
conducting business for an eight-hour period. The court held that
23. See, e.g., RSVT Holdings, LLC v. Main St. Am. Assurance Co., 25 N.Y.S.3d
712, 713-14 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) (describing a data breach at a burger chain that
resulted in a lawsuit to replace 1,700 debit cards, and finding the electronic data
exclusion in the CGL policy barred coverage for the negligent handling of customer
data).
24. Am. Online, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 347 F.3d 89 (4th Cir. 2003).
25. See id at 95; see also State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Midwest Computs. &
More, 147 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1116 (W.D. Okla. 2001) ("Alone, computer data cannot be
touched, held, or sensed by the human mind; it has no physical substance. It is not
tangible property."); Ward Gen. Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Emp'rs Fire Ins. Co., 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d
844, 851 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that the database was not tangible, even though it
may have been stored on physical media).
26. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Ingram Micro, Inc., No. 99-185 TUC ACM,
2000 WL 726789 (D. Ariz. Apr. 18, 2000); see also, e.g., Se. Mental Health Ctr., Inc. v.
Pac. Ins. Co., 439 F. Supp. 2d 831, 837 (W.D. Tenn. 2006) (finding that a power loss
resulting in pharmacy data corruption was a covered "direct physical loss").
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"'physical damage' is not restricted to the physical destruction or harm
of computer circuitry but includes loss of access, loss of use, and loss of
functionality."27
Similarly, in Ashland Hospital Corp. v. Affiliated FM Insurance
Co.,28 the court determined that the policyholder-hospital could recover
for loss of data reliability because excessive temperatures had resulted in
a "direct physical loss" to the data, but at a microscopic level, invisible to
the naked eye. The conclusion in this case inches closer to blurring the
boundary between the physical/cyber-loss divide. Perhaps, however, the
Ashland court's conclusion could be explained because the application of
an external physical force-heat-to the computers resulted in the data
loss.
This is the type of risk in an all-risks policy that the court would
expect to possibly attract coverage (as would a power loss in Ingram
Micro). It is the type of risk courts are used to dealing with in coverage
litigation. The loss of corrupted data in the America Online case was not
covered because its loss of use was due to a series of "computers-only"
electronic events, as opposed to the application of some physical external
force to the data and its substrate.
Cyber losses due to crime or fraud are also no different in end result
than losses due to crime or fraud in the physical world. A bank may be
cyber hacked to illegally send monetary wire transfers to illicit accounts,
often with the unwitting "help" of a bank employee who creates a lapse
in security by opening a spam email or remaining logged in to her
computer. But such losses could also happen by more traditional, non-
cyber means. A bank employee could forget his key in the bank vault,
allowing some interloper to create a distraction and lift some money.
Similarly, a bank employee could be duped into cashing checks or
transferring money to incorrect places due to some in-person direction by
a fraudster. Bank bond and financial institution insurance would cover
the losses occasioned by the traditional bank fraud methods, but many
exclude the cyber-related losses, or offload those losses onto more
strictly worded add-on cyber-specific products.
For example, a hacker used a computer virus to break into a real
estate broker's online banking system and transferred funds to various
accounts in Metro Brokers, Inc. v. Transportation Insurance Co. 29 The
policy at issue provided coverage for "forgery." The court concluded that
this computer funds transfer did not qualify as a covered loss because the
27. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 2000 WL 726789, at *2.
28. Ashland Hosp. Corp. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., No. 11-16-DLB-EBA, 2013 WL
4400516 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 14, 2013).
29. Metro Brokers, Inc. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 603 F. App'x 833 (11th Cir. 2015).
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definition of "forgery" in the policy focused on forgery of a "check,
draft, promissory note or bill of exchange" and the "signing of a name":
all qualities inherent in the use of the paper form of negotiable
instruments. The policy wording did not note the electronic transfer of
funds. The hacker in this case used a virus to gain access to computer
IDs and passwords, but nothing was "signed."
Therefore, although there was coverage for the broker for "forgery"
of negotiable instruments, those instruments had to exist in paper form
and be forged by traditional paper means. It seems questionable that a
modem definition of "forgery" involving monetary instruments would
restrict itself to paper-based forms only, or that the insurer selling such a
product in the modem financial services world would be expecting to
cover only paper-based bank losses.
In the liability insurance realm, liability for property losses as a
result of negligence in the cyber world is often excluded from traditional
liability insurance policies. So, too, are privacy-related losses. The
standard exclusions for losses involving electronic data and computers
catch these types of losses (i.e., excluding liability for losses of
"software, data or other information that is in electronic form"). 0 If a
company selling online advertising negligently infects one of its clients
with a computer virus and renders the client's computers unusable, there
could be a coverage contest as to whether the loss is or is not covered.
This was the case in Eyeblaster, Inc. v. Federal Insurance Co. 3 1 in
Eyeblaster, despite the insurer's arguments to the contrary, the court
concluded that loss of use of a computer is loss of use of tangible
property, because access to the electronic data stored within is frustrated.
The fact that one requires a computer to access the data completes the
notion that the loss is "physical injury to tangible property."
The computer is a physical piece of equipment that is tangible. If
the same company that, was denied coverage due to data loss from a
power surge, virus, or accidental deletion spilled coffee on its own
equipment or another's computer server, rendering that same computer
unusable, either first-party property loss or liability to third parties
resulting from the spill would, without question, be' covered. This
dichotomy conflicts with the risk management purpose of insurance for
modem businesses.
Similarly, if a retailer has a privacy breach in its million-person
customer database and must pay for identity theft rehabilitation for those
30. For example, the CGL policy in Eyeblaster, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 613 F.3d 797
(8th Cir. 2010), provided liability coverage for "physical injury to tangible property" but
excluded from coverage liability for losses of "software, data or other information that is
in electronic form." See id. at 801.
31. Eyeblaster, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 613 F.3d 797 (8th Cir. 2010).
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million customers, a traditional liability policy would not cover that loss
due to the electronic data exclusion. Yet if that same retailer lost its
paper-based customer database because the records fell off the back of a
truck and were spirited away, liability for loss would generally be
covered by a CGL policy.
Each of the above losses has physical and cyber corollaries. Yet in
each case, the end result loss is the same to the policyholder, whether the
loss occurs in cyber or physical form. The cyber form of the loss perhaps
carries a greater risk of incidence. The cyber losses appear to occur more
easily because it takes less human interaction to produce a faster, more
widespread harm that cannot be contained as quickly as the same loss in
the physical world.
But this is a matter of the magnitude of the loss and the speed of its
spread rather than a matter of the form of the lost property or injury
inflicted on another. Insurers can protect themselves from undue
coverage responsibility through policy limits, retentions or deductibles,
and higher premiums. Complete exclusions of coverage normally are
found only when the peril is too risky for ordinary sales (e.g., war,
nuclear disaster, asbestos, pollution) or where the risk insured against is
the province of another commonly available type of insurance or is not a
risk common to the pool of policyholders as a whole. For example,
standard general liability policies exclude liquor liability because most
businesses do not serve alcohol. For bars, restaurants, and liquor stores,
liquor liability coverage is typically bought in a separate stand-alone
policy as needed.32 General liability policies exclude claims arising out of
use of an automobile not because the risk is too great, but because this is
traditionally the domain of automobile insurance.
32. However, this need not be .the case. Although not as counter-productive as
separating cyber risk, excluding liquor liability may have become anachronistic in a
world where home gatherings, office parties, and receptions serve alcohol and some
modern businesses (e.g., internet shoe retailer Zappos and internet reviewer Yelp) permit
employees to drink while working as a perk of the job. See Aman Singh, Drinking at
Work: Office Perk or Employee Right?, FORBES (Mar. 18, 2011), https://www.forbes.
com/sites/csr/2011/03/18/drinking-at-work-office-perk-or-employee-right/
#2b029e0526e3 (noting Bloomberg Businessweek report "that Yelp's headquarters in
San Francisco is equipped with 'a keg refrigerator' that 'supplies its employees with an
endless supply of beer'). One of us (Stempel) has visited Zappos HQ in Nevada, where
alcohol is available in the company mess hall and may be consumed at work (but we saw
no obvious inebriation of the workers). General liability policies could include dram shop
coverage, at least by endorsement, and deal with the risk presented through pricing and
policy limits or sub-limits. As discussed throughout this article, we see advantages in
bundling coverage to the extent feasible. Where coverage is fragmented among different
lines of insurance, there will be gaps in coverage varying according to the skill of
individual brokers or agents. Where pricing is disaggregated, policyholders will make
more "penny-wise, pound-foolish" decisions to forgo purchase of necessary additional
coverage where premiums are perceived as too high.
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Data can be accidentally erased with the push of a button or the
accidental opening of a spain email. In the physical world, while a fire
can do the same type of damage, the risk of that fire wiping out physical
records is far lower. Today's employees are on the computer keyboards
day in and day out, thus increasing the opportunity for an error. The
chance of a fire is simply less, but it is not radically different in kind
from many losses involving the use of computers and electronics.
Consequently, for cyber losses, the incidence and scope of harm
may be higher than in the physical world, at least until the world gets
better at technological safeguards, which it undoubtedly will, over time.
The exclusions for the cyber versions of these losses persist in traditional
liability and property policies, despite the end result losses leaving
policyholders in the same place, and despite the prevalence of computers
and electronic data in the modem commercial world.
To put the issue in perspective, think about the continuum of
technological difference in storing music for personal use. If a
policyholder lost her personal music collection and claimed such loss
under a property policy, should it matter that the music was stored on
vinyl, in 8-track form, on a compact disc (CD), or in digital form? Is not
the loss the same to the policyholder regardless of the form in which the
property is stored? Insurance does not require physicality to take effect.
Hazel Glenn Beh rightly reminds that standard insurance policies
insure many losses resulting from intangible and invisible processes. 33
Damages from pollution or gas, mold, odors, and asbestos are all losses
covered by typical insurance policies. They are no less "physical" than
electronic processes and can certainly be pervasive, serious losses. In
addition, courts are well versed at solving cases dealing with trigger of
coverage issues concerning liability for bodily injury or property damage
when that damage has not become visible. 34
As long as the loss occurs during the policy period, it does not
matter to courts whether the loss occurs at a cellular or molecular level,
or even if it is visible or detectable at the time. One only has to think of
liability for long-latency injuries from asbestos or pollution or
contaminated water where the victim does not discover actual harm until
years after exposure. Standard insurance policies still provide coverage
for those long-latency, "invisible at the time" wrongs. So, when losses
occur in the digital world at the level of "ones" and "zeros," carving out
coverage based on the "physicality" of the loss at issue seems somewhat
33. See Hazel Glenn Beh, Physical Losses in Cyberspace, 8 CONN. INS. L.J. 55, 66
(2001).
34. See 2 STEMPEL & KNUTSEN, supra note 3, § 14.09[B].
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suspect. Those "ones" and "zeros" still exist-they just exist in a
different format.
. This cyber-versus-physical difference, to us, is an underwriting
concern and not a coverage concern. The same type of damage is
covered under traditional insurance product lines if the loss occurs in a
non-cyber fashion. It is difficult to understand that, in today's
commercial environment where everything is stored electronically and
most business is conducted in an entirely electronic fashion, such losses
are excluded from the standard, basic, mainstream, and run-of-the-mill
insurance products that form the backbone of ordinary risk management
and are owned by nearly every business and homeowner (at least in the
United States and Canada).
To flip the argument: What good are modern CGL, property,
directors and officers liability, and homeowners liability and property
policies without coverage for cyber harms? Coverage may not be
"illusory" in the most extreme sense. A policy barring cyber-related
coverage still provides protection from physical loss. But in the modern
world, many consider the Internet and computer access as essential
services-a utility as ubiquitous as telephone and water service. For
many people, a computer freeze or data loss is dramatically more
troublesome than a broken window or a modestly leaking roof.
Nonetheless, the core, standardized policies (homeowners,
automobile, and general liability) do not provide coverage for many
cyber-related losses. The insurance industry remains in the grip of out-
dated and perhaps ill-conceived concepts of insurability that
unnecessarily hinge on physicality.
To be sure, when computer technology first arrived on the scene, it
would undoubtedly have challenged insurance underwriting to predict
the scope of losses at play. But at this juncture it seems more than a little
irritating that mainstream insurance policies continue to exclude from
coverage these now-commonplace losses.
There appears to be no legitimate defensible risk-related argument
for failing to include cyber losses within the scope of ordinary risk.
Although one cannot discount honest industry apprehension about
insuring such risk without separate underwriting focus, 35 one need not be
35. See generally Sean M. Fitzpatrick, Fear Is the Key: A Behavioral Guide to
Underwriting Cycles, 10 CONN. INs. L.J. 255 (2004) (arguing that insurers, despite being
in the business of risk shifting and spreading, exhibit risk averse tendencies based on a
combination of valid concerns and cognitive errors such as overvaluing a risk that has
been highlighted due to recent events). Cognitive psychologists have, for example,
identified an "availability heuristic," in which persons are unduly affected by events
reported in the media or recent experiences even when those events pose less risk than
more commonplace events that make the newspaper. See Timur Kuran & Cass R.
Sunstein, Controlling Availability Cascades, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 374,
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a cynic to ascribe the situation to insurers taking advantage of market
cohesion and a real upsurge in policy sales due to forced market
segmentation between insurance products covering cyber and non-cyber
losses.
There is little incentive for the industry to rewrite policies to cover
these losses unless the market so demands, or unless courts, in their
regulatory function, begin to peer through the veneer and realize that
certain narrow interpretations of cyber-loss coverage actually nullify the
very coverage purchased by the policyholder.
IV. PUBLICATION AND ACCESS HURDLES TO COVERAGE FOR THE
RELEASE OF PRIVATE DIGITAL DATA
The same pattern of difficulties in determining coverage with any
consistency is exhibited in cases about whether or not electronic privacy
breaches are dovered under CGL policies. Those cases attempt to fit the
coverage language into a landscape where the privacy breach is not
through paper-based physical publication but is instead through online
means. The fallacies with analogizing to privacy breaches in the physical
world lead courts to produce some unexpected and questionable
coverage results.
For example, in Zurich American Insurance Co. v. Sony Corp. of
America,36 the CGL policy at issue did not cover Sony's liability when
hackers caused a massive data breach from Sony's PlayStation
videogame customer database, releasing millions of garners' personal
identifications and financial information online. Because the hackers
were third parties and not Sony, the court determined that the policy did
not cover Sony's liability for "oral or written publication in any manner
of the material that violates a person's right of privacy." The court
determined that the phrase "in any manner" modified the word
"publication" and did not relate to how the material was published (i.e.,
by someone other than Sony, like a hacker). Thus, if Sony itself had
accidentally released the data, its liability would have been covered. But
because the hackers released the data but used Sony's computers to do it,
that was somehow an uncovered event.
This same strict approach to privacy-related electronic "publication"
was also followed in Recall Total Information Management Inc. v.
381 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000). For example, many people are afraid to swim in the
ocean for fear of shark attack, which is extremely rare, but those same folks regularly
drive an automobile, which presents a far greater risk of serious injury. See Cass
Sunstein, Introduction to BEHAVIORAL LAW AND EcoNoMIcs, supra, at 1, 9.
36. Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Sony Corp. Am., Index No. 651982/2011, 2014 N.Y.
Misc. LEXIS 5141 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 24, 2014).
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Federal Insurance Co.,37 where a storage company lost computer tapes
that fell off its truck during transport. The owner of the tapes sued the
storage company for reimbursement of identity theft services it had to
provide to its customers who had their personal data on the tapes. The
court found that the loss of the tapes was not a "personal injury" under
the storage company's CGL policy, and thus no coverage attached.
"Personal injury" was defined as "an 'injury ... caused by an offense
of ... electronic, oral, written or other publication of material that ...
violates a person's right of privacy.'
Because the tapes fell off a truck and were retrieved by someone
else but not "published," according to the court, there was no
corresponding privacy violation. The potential for wrongful access to the
information was not something covered by the policy. The court's
treatment of "publication" required the publication to occur in the
traditional sense, at a particular moment in time, rather than through the
loss of control of private electronic information such that its publication
might occur at some unknown moment in the future (and very easily,
because the information exists in electronic form).
Other courts have come to contrasting interpretations as to how
electronic information is "published" and whether privacy breaches are
covered under insurance policies. When the contents of customers'
online music libraries were released on the Internet by a third-party
hacker, the court in Oscines v. Mt. Hood Insurance Co. 38 held that the
CGL policy in question covered the music service's liability, even
though the coverage language was identical to that in the Sony case:
"publication in any manner." The court held that "in any manner" did
include release by third-party hackers. In Travelers Indemnity Co. of
America v. Portal Healthcare Solutions, L.L. C.,39 liability coverage for
"publication" of private health data that was accidentally available on the
public Internet did not hinge on proof of someone accessing that data, as
it did in Recall Total. The court determined instead that "publication"
meant placing the data so that the public can access it-the definition
does not require actual access.40
These decisions about "publication" of private electronic data run
into consistency issues when the concept of cyber "publication" is
37. Recall Total Info. Mgmt., Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 115 A.3d 458 (Conn. 2015).
38. Oscines v. Mt. Hood Ins. Co., No. 1401-426 (Or. Cir. Ct. July 2, 2015).
39. Travelers Indem. Co. of Am. v. Portal Healthcare Sols., L.L.C., 644 F. App'x.
245 (4th Cir. 2016).
40. Id; see also Gregory D. Podolak, Insurance for Cyber Risks: A Comprehensive
Analysis of the Evolving Exposure, Today's Litigation, and Tomorrow's Challenges, 33
QuINNIPIAc L. REv. 369, 389 (2015) (preferring the court's reasoning in Portal instead of
Recall Total).
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differentiated from traditional publication using printed media. That
should not be the case. In today's world, where most media is consumed
online and not in hard-copy print format, analogies to the non-digital
publication process prompt courts to strike conclusions that are illogical
and difficult to port from one context to the next. Instead, courts should
focus on the loss claimed, not on the process of the loss. The loss is the
cost to repair a data privacy breach-costs that range from credit
reporting remediation to identity protection and rebuilding.
Whether the data was accessed by anyone at the time of the claim is
not the point-the cost to repair the potential for harm is already borne
by the policyholder out of necessity after discovering the breach.
Focusing instead on issues of access to the information or how the data
leaked and got "published" splits hairs that are not relevant to the loss.
Whether the data fell off the back of a truck, was released by a hacker, or
was pasted to the web accidentally by an employee asleep at the
keyboard, the loss can be traced to some negligent conduct on the part of
the policyholder. No policyholder would expect coverage for such a
cyber loss to turn on a close reading of terms that would cover the loss if
it resulted from a print-based publication.
V. THE MARKET SEGMENTATION NIGHTMARE IN A BRAVE NEW
COVERAGE WORLD
The resulting market segmentation between coverage for cyber-
related losses in traditional insurance policies and coverage in the myriad
of cyber-related insurance products has been nightmarish for
policyholders and insurers alike. Naturally, litigation has ensued to test
the boundaries of this new insurance language contained in cyber-
specific insurance products. The litigation has stemmed largely as a
result of four trends in recent cyber-insurance litigation: narrow
definitions of covered losses, difficulty with shoehorning claims into pre-
determined categories of losses, questions about coverage scope, and
challenges to untested moral hazard mitigation efforts baked into the
policies themselves.
The resulting gaps in coverage to date have been troubling, as the
cyber-insurance world is not lining up with the coverage experience
policyholders would reasonably expect had their losses been claimed as
physical, non-cyber losses under more traditional insurance policies. This
market segmentation nightmare has therefore created somewhat of a wild
west of coverage experience in this burgeoning market. That has cost
insurers and policyholders alike, as shaky coverage expectations drive up
the incidence, and thus the cost, of litigation.
662 [Vol. 122:3
TECHNO-NEUTRALITY SOLUTION
Policies providing coverage for a data breach or data loss have very
narrow definitions of what type of loss is covered. Problems of insurance
causation can result as insurers and policyholders attempt to bring claims
out of, or into, coverage. For example, in State Bank of Bellingham v.
BancInsure, Inc.,41 the insurer argued that the bank's financial institution
bond providing coverage for "computer systems fraud" would not cover
the bank's losses when a computer virus, carried out by spain email,
accidentally infected the bank's systems so that a third party could gain
access to the bank's wire transfer system. The insurer asserted that the
loss did not result from "computer systems fraud" but instead resulted
from employee violations of workplace policies regarding computer use,
such as failing to control computer password use, enact anti-virus
software, or follow policies about spain email.
The court determined that Minnesota's concurrent causation
doctrine ensured coverage for this loss because the proximate cause of
the loss was the fraudulent virus, not actions by any employee. The result
in this case makes sense if one considers the whole purpose of the
"computer systems fraud" coverage in the financial institution bond: to
protect against fraudulent bank losses. An employee slipping up on
following bank policies for payments, while negligent behavior, seems to
be precisely the kind of conduct that leads to such financial fraud in the
first place. Otherwise, coverage would be negated for the very risk the
bank attempted to insure against.
However, the opposite result was reached in Apache Corp. v. Great
American Insurance Co.,42 where a bank employee transferred $2.4
million to a fraudster who sent an email request to the bank, but used a
similar, though not identical, email domain name to a trusted client. The
Fifth Circuit concluded that the bank's loss did not result "directly from
the use of any computer to fraudulently cause a transfer," but instead
resulted from the bank's failure to adequately investigate the identity of
the fraudster.43 Causation, in this case, was used as an argument against
coverage.
41. State Bank of Bellingham v. BancInsure, Inc., No. 13-CV-0900, 2014 WL
4829184 (D. Minn. Sept. 29, 2014), aff'd, 823 F.3d 456 (8th Cir. 2016).
42. Apache Corp. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 662 F. App'x 252, 259 (5th Cir. 2016).
43. See id. at 258-59; see also Taylor & Lieberman v. Fed. Ins. Co., 681 F. App'x
627, 628-30 (9th Cir. 2017); Am. Tooling Ctr., Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am.,
No. 16-12108, 2017 WL 3263356, at *1-4 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 1, 2017); InComm Holdings
Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., No. 1:15-CV-2671-WSD, 2017 WL 1021749, at *8-9 (N.D.
Ga. Mar. 16, 2017); Aqua Star (USA) Corp. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., No. C-
14-1368RSL, 2016 WL 3655265, at *1-4 (W.D. Wash. July 8, 2016). In Taylor &
Lieberman, the court found no coverage under the crime policy at issue when an
accounting firm transferred funds due to fraudulent email. Taylor & Lieberman, 681 F.
App'x at 628. Further, the court found that "forgery" coverage was inapplicable because
there was no forgery from the email instruction. Id. at 629. Also, the "computer fraud"
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This result begs the question: What could this policy cover if not
this type of fraud? How "direct" must the computer use be? The result is
particularly puzzling in that the denial of coverage is based on a narrow
reading of the clause that purports to grant coverage for computer fraud
losses."
In addition, policyholders who are liable for the loss or erroneous
publication or corruption of client data struggle to shoehorn their claims
into ones of privacy, wrongful act, publication, or errors and omissions
coverage. Seemingly opposite results were borne out in two cases
involving errors and omissions cyber insurance.
In Eyeblaster Inc. v. Federal Insurance Co., the policyholder, an
online media company, allegedly infected one of its clients with spyware
from one of its online ads.45 The client was unable to use its computer
and sued the policyholder. The policyholder's errors and omissions cyber
policy (called a "Network Technology Errors or Omissions" policy) was
coverage was found inapplicable because the sending email was not unauthorized "entry
into" computer systems, and the fraudulent emails instructing funds to be wired were not
"introduction of instructions" that "propagate themselves" through computer systems. Id.
Lastly, the funds transfer coverage also did not apply because, although the firm did not
know the emailed instructions were fraudulent, it was aware funds were being wired. Id.
at 629-30. This case begs the question: What does the crime policy actually cover? In
American Tooling, fraudulent emails resulted in wire transfers. Am. Tooling, 2017 WL
3263356, at *1. However, because the policyholder verified the production information
and authorized payments, the court found that the policyholder did not suffer a "direct"
loss "directly caused" by the use of a computer, as these events intervened in that
computer use, ousting coverage. Id. at *2-3. In InComm Holdings, the court found that
"computer fraud" coverage requiring "use of any computer to fraudulently cause a
transfer" was not triggered when a debit card processing company's telephonic system
was exploited through a coding error and the company lost $10.3 million in unauthorized
telephonic redemptions. InComm Holdings, 2017 WL 1021749, at *8. The court
concluded that the loss did not result directly from the "use of any computer" to access
the telephonic system, even though computers were used in the telephonic system's
operation. Id. at *8-9. In Aqua Star, a seafood business's customer hacked and sent
fraudulent emails for wire transfers. Aqua Star, 2016 WL 3655265, at *1. The crime
policy at issue provided no coverage because of an exclusion for "loss resulting directly
or indirectly from the input of Electronic Data." See id. at *2, *4. The policyholder's
employee had updated a spreadsheet to include payment information sent by the hacker
and the court concluded that this update was a necessary step before initiating the transfer
of funds and, thus, an indirect cause of the loss. See id. at *4.
44. See Apache Corp., 662 F. App'x at 259. Contra Principle Sols. Grp., LLC v.
Ironshore Indem., Inc., No. 1:15-CV-4130-RWS, 2016 WL 4618761, at *1-2, *5 (N.D.
Ga. Aug. 30, 2016) (describing how the commercial crime policy at issue provided
coverage for "computer and funds transfer fraud" when bank transferred $1.7 million
dollars to fraudster's account as a result of fraudulent email, and finding that the
"computer and funds transfer fraud" clause was ambiguous so there was coverage even
though intervening events occurred between the fraud and the loss); Medidata Sols., Inc.
v. Fed. Ins. Co., 268 F. Supp. 3d 471, 480, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (finding coverage for
computer fraud when fraudulent email resulted in wire transfers because emails contained
code that masked hacker's identity to fool policyholder into approving wire transfer).
. 45. Eyeblaster, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 613 F.3d 797, 799-800 (8th Cir. 2010).
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triggered because the media company's acts qualified as a covered
"wrongful act" that resulted in some product failure. While the insurer
argued that the harm was not resulting from a "wrongful act" because the
policyholder intentionally placed its software on the victim client's
computer, the court rightly concluded that, while the act may have been
intentional, the consequences of the act were unintentional and thus
"wrongful" under the terms of the policy.
Contrast that result with the result in Travelers Property Casualty
Co. of America v. Federal Recovery Services, Inc.46 There, the insurer
was not required to defend a claim against its policyholder, an electronics
records processor who claimed under its CyberFirst policy (which
featured a technology errors and omissions form), because the
policyholder was being sued by a client for withholding data access until
the policyholder was paid for its services. The client sued the
policyholder for conversion, breach of contract, and tortious interference,
but not for negligence. Because none of the allegations involved errors or
omissions, the court concluded there was no duty to defend the
policyholder.
It seems an odd result that a claim for withholding electronic
financial data is not covered under an errors and omissions policy and
that the plaintiffs pleading would control that analysis without further
consideration of the nature of the allegations pled. This case was dealt
with at the pleadings stage, however, and there may well have been some
negligence on the part of the policyholder in determining how and why
to withhold electronic data. The policyholder was actually in the business
of storing and processing electronic data for customers. When sued for
issues surrounding that kind of work, the policyholder likely would not
have expected coverage to be denied.
This is a different sort of analysis for determining conduct
triggering errors and omissions coverage than that of the Eyeblaster case.
In Eyeblaster, although the policyholder-media company's actions were
intentional in putting the infected media on the customer's computer, the
harm was not expected and was borne of negligence. One could make a
similar argument in the Federal Recovery case that while the withholding
of data services in the expectation of payment may have been an
intentional decision, the resulting harm to the client was entirely
unintentional (and, although perhaps dirty pool vis-A-vis commercial
relations, was probably borne of negligence in managing payment risk).
Some policyholders experience gaps in coverage because the
current cyber-insurance market has yet to have the experience or
46. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. Fed. Recovery Servs., Inc., 103 F. Supp. 3d
1297, 1302 (D. Utah 2015).
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foresight to predict how reasonable losses may be incurred as a result of
cyber-related behavior.4 7 An entity that must compensate a third-party
financial institution for losses from data breach may be surprised to learn
that coverage under many cyber policies only attaches if the
policyholder-entity, and not the third-party financial institution, is the
target of a wrongful act. This can be true even though the financial
institution is the processor of all transactions for the policyholder and can
pass along the costs of such wrongful acts to the policyholder.
For example, in P.F. Chang's China Bistro, Inc. v. Federal
Insurance Co.,48 when a hacker posted thousands of restaurant customer
credit card numbers to the Internet, the restaurant was charged a
substantial fee from a major bank that processed the credit card
transactions because the credit card company's own fraud recovery costs
were charged to the bank (for fraudulent transactions from the published
credit cards). The restaurant's insurer refused to cover the fee the bank
levied on the restaurant because the policy provided coverage for a
"privacy injury" and the insured was the restaurant, not the credit card
company or the bank processing the transactions. Even though the
restaurant had a contractual arrangement with the bank about the
responsibility for fees relating to data breaches, the court determined that
the fees the restaurant had to pay the bank were not because of a "privacy
injury" to the policyholder.
This result exposes a failure as to how cyber-loss coverage is
presently designed to respond to the entire scope of a loss for a modern
"privacy injury." The loss to the restaurant is substantial and borne
precisely because of the data privacy breach that spawned the claim to
the insurer. However, because the loss was realized from the restaurant's
contractual relationship with its suppliers, the loss was excluded from
coverage. On the one hand, one can argue that the dealings of
policyholders with various entities are not the subject of insurance.
Otherwise, how could an insurer control risk exposure if it had to cover
losses that were controlled by contractual dealings with third parties?
On the other hand, this is precisely a predictable-and insurable, at
least in concept-expense from a data breach. It is foreseeable that one
loss from the leak of customer financial information would be the
remediation cost a third-party financial institution would have to
undertake when making good for wrongful credit card payments. To
have that cost passed back to the restaurant seems sensible and consistent
47. See Podolak, supra note 40, at 372 (raising the issue that current cyber risk
insurance policies may not be accurately predicting the full scope of data breach expenses
suffered by policyholders).
48. P.F. Chang's China Bistro, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. CV-15-01322-PHX-SMM,
2016 WL 3055111 (D. Ariz. May 31, 2016).
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with insurance concepts of subrogation. Yet to have that loss excluded
from coverage for the "privacy injury" seems a stretch. Many
commercial establishments would be caught unaware, to say the least.
Finally, a surprising number of cyber-insurance policies incorporate
various pre-loss cyber-security requirements to which a policyholder
must adhere in order to obtain coverage post-loss. Some include
standards to which data must be kept. Others require security processes
and policies to meet a specified standard. Still others demand that
policyholders have undergone pre-loss training or security audits before
coverage will attach under the policy.
In Columbia Casualty Co. v. Cottage Health Systems,49 for
example, a health organization that experienced a server breach that
compromised the confidentiality of medical records for 32,500 patients
turned to its "NetProtect360" cyber-insurance policy for coverage when
faced with a class action in response to the breach. The insurer sought
recoupment of defense costs because it alleged the organization
misrepresented that it took security steps required by the policy's
"Failure to Follow Minimum Required Practices" exclusion.
Specifically, the insurer alleged the health organization did not properly
maintain its servers to prevent access by outside computers nor did it
properly monitor for unauthorized access data.
The aim of these sorts of pre-loss electronic security requirements is
to mitigate moral hazard by ensuring the policyholder adheres to some
basic data security standards. Of course, who sets the standards and what
the standards include are the live issues. Uncertainty abounds as various
policies have differing requirements for "pre-coverage" standards to be
met. It is the insurer setting the data standards, which may or may not be
reasonable in today's commercial market. How is a policyholder to know
whether it can, or even should, meet insurer-set data security standards?
How is a policyholder to know those insurer-set standards are up-to-date,
relevant, and appropriate?
In addition, this type of extra-contractual behavior requirement can
act to neutralize coverage based on some third party's behavioral
standards. This is a marked change from the non-cyber liability insurance
context, where policyholder negligence (i.e., the tort standard) is used to
trigger liability coverage. Instead, in the cyber-insurance context, a
perhaps time-stamped and ephemeral insurer-chosen standard of pre-loss
behavior acts as an ever-moving gatekeeper to coverage. Policyholders
are left to navigate this uncertain coverage landscape.
49. Columbia Cas. Co. v. Cottage Health Sys., No. 2:15-cv-0343
2
, 2015 WL
4497730 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2015).
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What is even stranger about the Cottage Health Systems example is
that the pre-loss computer security requirements demanded by the insurer
are acting as post-claim underwriting opportunities for the insurer. The
insurer sells the policy, then trusts that policyholder representations
about various computer security protocols are true. After the loss, if the
policyholder has not met the insurer-specified behavioral standards, that
insurer can back out of coverage. This is akin to an attempt by the insurer
to eliminate substantially all risks and is not really an issue aimed at
regulating policyholder moral hazard with respect to computer security.
If a policyholder had perfect compliance with computer security,
the risk of loss should be zero. Put another way, as long as the data
security loss is fortuitous, and the policyholder acted reasonably in
general toward network and data security, the loss should be covered.
Resting coverage on the specific instance of policyholder behavior
through which the very claim arises seems somewhat suspect.
Much of the haphazard nature of coverage litigation to date with
cyber-insurance policies can be expected with the variety of products,
policy wording, and level of underwriting experience of insurers With
cyber claims thus far. For this reason, as time marches on, one can expect
that the market will become more streamlined in terms of policy forms
and litigation experiences. However, in the meantime, beyond structural
issues of market variance, the market segmentation problem is vastly
augmented because of the trappings of language and thought anchored in
the physical, non-cyber world.
VI. THE REACTIONARY APPROACH TO "CYBER" ANYTHING
Coverage gaps and increased litigation uncertainty in the cyber-
insurance world are mainly stemming from an unhelpful-and probably
inaccurate-approach toward the nature of cyber losses. As mentioned
above, cyber losses may differ in degree, but not in kind, from losses in
the physical world. But, for the most part, cyber losses do not differ at all
from physical-world losses. The nature of property and liability have
necessarily changed with the impact of the digital world. It is about time
the insurance world caught up to it. The dangers to policyholders and
insurers alike in this new cyber-insurance world stem from two trends:
unhelpful analogy to the physical world and insurance market
overreaction.
The coverage scope of non-cyber-specific policies often excludes
cyber-related losses. As we explained above, for historical reasons, the
scope, kind, and degree of loss may not have been knowable at the time
the exclusions appeared on the market. Surely, however, by now,
computers are not new to the world. Yet the exclusions remain. It is as if
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insurers are pretending that it is still 1984 and the world is wondering
what will happen next with computers. At the time of the introduction of
computers to commerce, and life in general, insurers could be forgiven
for being understandably wary and excluding such losses from coverage
until the world stabilized. But nowadays?
The result has been that insurance policies, including both cyber and
non-cyber, are running on analogies to policy language built for the
physical world. These analogies simply do not work anymore. For
example, a property policy typically covers "direct physical loss or
damage." Cases abound about whether or not a cyber loss is a "physical
loss." It is not physical in the sense that the bits of data cannot be
touched. Yet the data exists, as a series of ones and zeros at least,
somewhere. The loss to that data is often not occasioned by the
traditional causes of loss: physical force to an object. The loss is often
triggered through some user step, like a keystroke, that is not in and of
itself harmful. Or stranger still, the loss is often occasioned by a
computer hacker or virus.
Courts struggle with how to analogize the apparent lack of
"physicality" of electronic data to how lightning strikes a house or fire
bums up papers. That struggle typically devolves into a discussion about
the very nature of the specific technology at issue and how it operates
differently as compared to how a similar loss might operate in the
physical world. The analysis just about never focuses on the nature of the
loss as a loss in and of itself.
While law is itself a self-referential exercise that relies on past case
precedent and stare decisis from which the bedrock of the legal system
comes, in the cyber-insurance sphere, the system is relying on past
analogies that just do not work. The focus of the analysis should be on
the core risk management principles embedded within the insurance
product-fortuity and the bargained-for protection from fortuitous
losses-not on how the loss actually happened and its "cyber-esque"
quality that makes it "different" from physical-world losses.
The pattern of courts overblowing new developments with fanciful
and apocalyptic analogies is not a new one-and certainly .is not new in
insurance law. One only has to look to the Year 2000 bug hype in the late
1990s to see how an explosion of Y2K insurance coverage products and
concerns came to naught as the Y2K issue itself came and went with
nary a whimper. This "chicken little" response of the legal sky about to
fall was put best by one of the authors as this: "A new development is
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treated as if it is a new type of law rather than an old type of law in a new
context."5 0
That statement works equally well for both the courts' approach to
cyber-versus-physical analogies in coverage cases and the insurance
industry's market response to cyber losses. In an attempt to maintain its
current market-segmented stance but, at the same time, capitalize on the
potential profit source of coverage for cyber-related losses, insurers have
developed new products in new policy forms with new coverages that
did not exist before (at least with untested language).
The pattern above of court interpretation of novel coverage terms is
also not new or unique to the cyber-insurance world. The insurance
world has had past experience with new forms of coverage or the.
introduction of major exclusions. The interpretive pattern in the courts
has been similar. The interpretation typically starts with a broad, far-
reaching interpretation, which is very quickly narrowed down to
something more measured in result. Then, the interpretive results get a
sort of ratcheting back up in a more nuanced fashion to something of an
interpretive equilibrium (with concomitant redrafting of policy language
to something more appropriate-a reasonable response from insurers).
The classic example of this pattern is the court experience with the
standard pollution exclusion in CGL policies or the interpretation of
business interruption coverage in CGL policies.
Outside of insurance, we saw a similar phenomenon in civil
procedure with the advent of the Internet. Courts then faced questions
regarding whether emails or websites (passive or active) supported the
exercise of personal jurisdiction. After a decade or so of fits and starts, a
body of law emerged that sensibly applied traditional "minimum
contacts" personal jurisdiction analysis in this new context without the
need for special rules for cyber contacts with a forum.5 2 Issues regarding
electronic discovery proved more difficult and prompted special
amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as long analyses by
groups such as the Sedona Conference. 53 But, in our view, some of this
trip may not have been necessary. The better-reasoned decisions
50. Stempel, supra note 2, at 174 (predicting, in 1999, that the insurance experience
post-Y2K would not be "Armageddon").
51. See, e.g., Beh, supra note 33, at 77 (noting the necessary transition period that
traditional insurance product lines will face due to attempts to sort out coverage issues for
cyber losses); Jerry & Mekel, supra note 1, at 26 (tracing the evolutionary path of
commercial liability insurance and particularly the "erosion" of comprehensive business
coverage as e-commerce exclusions emerge).
52. See JEFFREY W. STEMPEL ET AL., LEARNING CIVIL PROCEDURE 118-19 (2d ed.
2015).
53. See JANET WALKER ET AL., THE CIVIL LITIGATION PROCESS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 456-59 (8th ed. 2016).
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regarding electronic discovery simply apply time-honored concepts of
relevance, privilege, burdensomeness, and spoliation to records that are
electronic rather than paper.
The genesis of the modem CGL insurance policy and even the
homeowners insurance policy also display a similar pattern of product
development.54 Those policies each went from initial offerings of broad,
all-risks coverage at market introduction to (very quickly) a coverage
offering riddled with exclusions to a backing-off and recent
augmentation of certain forms of coverage (like identity theft coverage
now becoming more standard in homeowners policies, for example).
We expect the same interpretive and market patterns to occur with
cyber-loss coverage, with one major exception. We predict and expect
that cyber coverage will, by necessity, become folded into standard
insurance products' coverage offerings. The digital age is well past due.
Requiring patchwork coverage solutions to now standard losses will
quickly become untenable in the insurance market.
Indeed, the removal of some cyber losses from standard coverage
may do such violence to policyholders' reasonable expectations of
coverage as to nullify the very purpose for which the insurance was
purchased, and, thus, invalidate an off-coverage response. The gaps in
coverage created by artificial market segmentation will expose market
opportunities and market failures. Insurers are nothing if not
opportunists, and for good reason. Being able to charge a single (perhaps
enhanced) premium for a one-stop shopping product that covers
traditional and cyber losses in one policy, without distinction, is the
natural outgrowth of the market.
A cyber-neutral product will be the next stage of the insurance
product genealogy because, otherwise, not only will the market capture
rate increases for insurers, but also the cost of uncertainty of many
patchwork policies operating with as-yet-untested language will be
problematic at best. Litigation will result. The cost of analogies to the
physical world and the interpretive uncertainty of cyber-specific
language will funnel insurers, we expect, to create an all-in policy-and
in short order.
We expect this market response from insurers because we have seen
this type of policy conglomeration before. Coverage that was once only
available as an add-on through endorsement or drop-down coverage thus
gradually creeps into the main coverage grants of a standard general
policy over time. Policyholder expectations of coverage, at some point,
54. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY: INSURANCE AND TORT LAW
FROM THE PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/11 (2008) (tracing the history of the development of
liability insurance and its pervasive growth and effect on compensation for losses).
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become so entrenched that arguments about coverage nullification for
exclusion of standard losses become costly arguments for insurers to
meet.
As standard coverage terms in a policy morph and begin to
delineate more prevalent covered losses, it is forgotten that the coverage
piece was actually once only available as a standalone product or as a
tacked-on endorsement. The identity theft coverage that is currently
standard in most homeowners' property policies is an example of
coverage that was once, very recently, only available sparingly, and at an
extra expense for an additional rider to the policy. Now, it is incorporated
into most policies as baseline coverage. Business interruption coverage
was once a rare, add-on coverage to the CGL policy. Now, it is
commonplace in most CGL policies.
One can even trace this pattern back to the dawn of fire insurance
that protects the private dwelling. Today's homeowners' property
policies cover multiple perils beyond simply fire and also cover far more
than the mere dwelling to include outbuildings and other structures
detached from the dwelling, as well as personal contents of the home.
The cyber-loss market will soon, we expect, start to provide cyber-
related coverages in traditional lines of insurance as drop-down, or add-
on, coverage (likely for modest premium increases to account for the
additional risk underwritten).s
Coverage for cyber losses will necessarily follow this same route
simply because the commercial insurance market will demand it.
Today's current market segmentation of cyber products is, in all
likelihood, a false and time-limited segmentation. The losses are not
discrete between lines as they are between auto and non-auto policies, or
between commercial and homeowner liabilities. The distinction between
cyber and non-cyber losses is blurry at best, non-existent at worst. So,
the eventual collapsing of the cyber lines into appropriate traditional
insurance products fits with market expectations. Once one carrier offers
a cyber-neutral policy, other carriers will have no choice but to follow
suit. For who can run a business in today's world without using
computers and digital data and thus without embracing some degree of
risk from that use?
55. See JOHN BUCHANAN & DUSTIN CHO, ABA LITIG. SECTION, INS. COVERAGE
LITIG. COMM., WHEN THINGS GET HACKED: COVERAGE FOR CYBER-PHYSICAL RISKS
(2016), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/litigation/materials/
2016_insurance_coveragelitigation committee/writtenmaterials/2_cyberjphysicalhar
msjaper-final.authcheckdam.pdf (predicting that the cyber-market will blossom in this
fashion, with drop-down coverage on product lines like directors and officers liability
insurance).
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VII. THE INTERIM SOLUTION: A TECHNO-NEUTRAL APPROACH TO
POLICY INTERPRETATION
In the interim, before the insurance market responds with cyber-
neutral policies, the plethora of cyber-specific insurance coverages will
continue to clash with the non-cyber coverages. Gaps in coverage will
mutate. The interpretive landscape will be in flux. Litigation will remain
a constant. To weather this transition period, we suggest that courts adopt
a technologically neutral stance to the interpretation of insurance policy
language when faced with a coverage question involving a cyber loss. By
focusing on the nature of the loss itself, rather than its "cyber" quality,
and by grounding the interpretive analysis in basic bedrock insurance
principles of risk management and fortuity, courts will avoid the trap of
falling into unhelpful analogies to losses in the physical world or creating
unrealistic expectations for policyholders and insurers attempting to
determine coverage. We recognize that while it may well be that a few
savvy insurers are already developing cyber coverage products that
respond to a wider, more comprehensive array of cyber-related risks by
using more broadly worded coverage grants than have typically featured
to date in the case law, a techno-neutral jurisprudence will support those
insurer efforts by providing an effective nudge to the less savvy insurers
who are holding back the pack.
We suggest an interpretive solution because the tools of insurance
policy interpretation can quickly respond to a number of the issues with
emerging cyber coverage while the market sorts out how it will begin the
process of more holistically bundling cyber losses into standard
insurance products. For example, one tenet of interpretation holds that an
exclusion from coverage should not take away the very coverage
purportedly provided by the policy in the first place. A policy that
provides coverage for bank fraud cannot exclude coverage for bank fraud
as it reasonably most likely occurs in modem banks.
Another axiom of contract construction requires courts to interpret
coverage clauses broadly and exclusion clauses narrowly.56 In the cases
discussed in prior sections, many courts turned this rule of construction
on its head and erroneously took very narrow approaches to coverage
provisions found in cyber policies, reaching results we (and most
observers outside insurance companies) regard as incorrect. Applying
these standard concepts of construction in a fashion neutral to the
technology behind the loss will help courts reach consistent and correct
determinations.
56. 1 STEMPEL & KNUTSEN, supra note 3, § 4.04.
6732018]1
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
Techno-neutrality5 7 means treating the language of the policy
without regard to whether the loss is cyber-based or confined to the
tangible physical world. Techno-neutrality also means treating the loss
itself as the inherent resulting loss, and not according to its causality
(cyber or non-cyber). If it is true that cyber losses are just as insurable as
their parallel physical losses and still cause the same economic harm to a
policyholder, then the coverage question must necessarily shift to: "Why
is the physical loss covered but the cyber loss not?" Examining that
question leads a court to look at the inherent nature of the loss to the
policyholder and the type of coverage granted by the insurer.
In other words, the court should look at a category of loss
independent from its physical or electronic properties. For example, if a
coverage grant includes coverage for losses relating to a customer
database if that database exists in a physical form but not if it exists as
electronic data, a court should approach the coverage question from a
techno-neutral stance and ask: Did the insurer here mean to cover losses
relating to customer databases at all? If so, did it only mean to cover such
losses if they occurred in the physical form? If the answer is "yes," and
absurd results follow because coverage becomes largely illusory, this
suggests a problem with the policy.
A court should then ask what reasonable policyholders and insurers
would expect from the coverage. For example, a policyholder that had
purchased crime insurance would, presumably, be horrified to find out
that a million-dollar swindle was not covered merely because it was
perpetrated via email rather than over the phone. Similarly, a
policyholder that purchased cyber-crime insurance can hardly expect to
lose coverage on the ground that the swindle could have been
accomplished over the phone as well as via email.
Exclusions are often broadly written to apply to any loss "arising
out of' cyber activity, or whatever other peril the insurer seeks to remove
from coverage. Insurers are free to write exclusions broadly even if this
is inconsistent with the nature of the coverage sold to the policyholder.
But courts are not bound by an insurer's clever drafting and must,
nonetheless, interpret such exclusions narrowly because they are
exclusions subject to strict construction. In addition, the insurer seeking
to avoid coverage based on an exclusion has the burden of persuasion to
establish the applicability of the exclusion.
57. The "techno-neutrality" concept was first floated by one of us in the free speech
law context. See generally Erik S. Knutsen, Techno-Neutrality ofFreedom of Expression
in New Media Beyond the Internet: Solutions for the United States and Canada, 8 UCLA
ENT. L. REV. 87 (2001). It is equally apt for insurance law. See generally id
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Approaching coverage questions in a techno-neutral way prompts
two additional questions. First, what modem enterprise today does not
keep electronic records for customers? Second, does this type of
coverage prompt policyholders to only keep records in paper form? That
would be a silly response that makes little sense. On coverage
nullification, and also perverse moral hazard grounds, covering only
physical versions of the customer database leads that coverage grant to
be an exclusion in sheep's clothing. If it is an exclusion, it should be read
narrowly, contra proferentem as against the drafter, and should not be
permitted to nullify the very coverage it grants.
Taking a techno-neutral approach to insurance coverage questions
also helps courts steer clear from time-based analogies that render the
jurisprudence unstable and inconsistent. Serious jurisprudential trickle-
down effects can occur if a court assesses a certain quality of a cyber loss
too early in the life of the technology. For example, a court could find
that virtual reality technology is so new and revolutionary that losses
arising from its use must be qualitatively different than other losses.
Imagine an injury occurring while a participant wears a virtual reality
helmet that is projecting the appearance of another digital world to the
wearer and the wearer is injured in the physical world by, perhaps,
bumping into something that has real substance. Would liability coverage
not attach to the helmet manufacturer if it is sued? The technology here
is not inherently problematic in bringing about a risk of lawsuits.
Of course, evolution is not revolution and technology changes with
time, eventually gets staid, and is itself supplanted by the next latest-and-
greatest thing. If a court focuses on the technological novelty of the day,
or on the technological mechanics of the policyholder's inherent loss
claimed, there is a chance that the interpretive result could be date-
stamped and staid in time in relatively short order.
For example, it would be problematic to fixate on an interpretation
of a policy term that used a certain vision of the Internet, network
security, the cloud, and the World Wide Web as any of these exist at the
moment of interpretation. The qualities of paper versus electronic money
may be fascinating and almost magical but each is legal tender. Each can
be lost, stolen, bartered for, and bargained with. Each is no less "money"
than the other. They simply exist in different forms. At an insurance
coverage level, treating the loss of electronic funds differently than the
loss of paper money simply because of the physicality difference makes
little sense.
Where does the techno-neutral approach leave the "electronic data"
exclusion, an exclusion so prevalent in liability and property policies? A
textualist response to that exclusion would lead a court to exclude from
coverage all cyber losses at first blush. The text appears clear on its face:
6752018]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
no coverage for anything related to electronic data or computers. But a
trace of the case law shows that courts stretch far to attempt to find
coverage for losses by stretching the loss circumstances to include some
losses in the physical world that are not caught by the exclusion (for
example, the physical inability to use the computer as a circumstance
being covered as opposed to the loss of data on it).
We suspect courts are compelled to do this sort of violence to
allegedly "clear" text because the exclusion is at odds with a broad
coverage grant and the reasonable expectations of modem policyholders
who store practically their entire enterprises and personal lives in
electronic data form. To hold that the exclusion ousts coverage for only
the electronic forms of a loss makes little sense, as we have noted above.
In the insurance law context, there is an argument that the coverage
grant is surreptitiously nullified by this surprise exclusion. To be sure,
the exclusion makes about as much sense today as saying that only, losses
involving documents written in a quill pen are covered, whereas
ballpoint or typewritten documents are excluded. At a certain point,
credulity must snap (even to a textualist response). We think there is,
thus, some traction to courts interpreting the exclusion narrowly enough
to practically wipe it away as an exclusion that frustrates the very
coverage grant of the policy.
, This is, in our view, lamentable but not insoluble. There is an
alternative scenario-bundling cyber risk into commonly sold property
and liability policies. And there is a historical blueprint that insurers can
use in the course of achieving this scenario-the development of the
CGL policy. Prior to the CGL policy, what we now consider the general
liability risks attached to operating a business were insured through a
variety of policies, primarily Owners, Landlords, and Tenants Liability,
Public Liability Insurance, and Contractors Public Liability Insurance,
along with narrower insurance products such as Elevator Liability
Insurance, Teams Liability Insurance, Contractual Liability Insurance,
and Product Liability Insurance, as well as Owners Protective Liability
Insurance and Contractors Protective Liability Insurance. Insurers
realized that bundling these separate coverages into a single policy-
(labeled a "comprehensive" general liability policy before taking on its
current "commercial" general liability nomenclature) could be mutually
beneficial for policyholders and insurers.
58. See 2 KNUTSEN & STEMPEL, supra note 3, § 14.01 (describing the history,
development, and evolution of the CGL policy); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Rediscovering the
Sawyer Solution. Bundling Risk for Protection and Profit, 11 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
170, 172 (2013) (discussing the particular role of insurance company attorney Elmer
Sawyer in the development of the CGL policy and the continued potential for expansion
of the standard CGL form and other basic insurance products).
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Although it has become a clich6 to speak of win-win situations, the
CGL actually seems to have accomplished this. Policyholders were able
to simplify and streamline their insurance purchasing and have "one-stop
shopping" of sorts that reduced policyholder error in failing to purchase
sufficiently broad coverage. Insurers were able to encourage broader
sales than would have resulted from seriatim sales of narrower policies.
The comprehensive policy commanded higher premium payments
available to insurers for earning investment income. It also dampened the
adverse selection that could occur where policyholders purchased only
the coverages they were most likely to draw upon.59
The CGL policy has been an economic success for insurers and is
generally regarded as generating higher premiums than would have been
collected through piecemeal policy sales. 60 To be sure, the weight of
mass torts, such as asbestos and pollution liability claims, has strained
the industry at times. But the net negative economic aspect of asbestos
claims has been estimated at approximately a three percent reduction in
the earnings that would otherwise have been enjoyed by insurers. 6 '
As the CGL experience reflects, insurers cannot only remain solvent
but can profit from bundling risks, even in the face of mass tort
pressures. Even serious cyber exposure is unlikely to rival the asbestos
crisis already well weathered by the insurance industry. It would appear
that cyber coverage could be included in basic property and liability
policies without destabilizing risk markets. Or, perhaps more accurately,
restrictions on cyber coverage could be removed from basic policies.
We urge a more comprehensive, techno-neutral approach to
coverage of cyber losses. We do not argue for economic evisceration of
insurers. Surely, some readers will criticize our proposal on the ground
that it exposes insurers to excessively large risk if included in core
policies and that cyber risk must be separately underwritten and priced to
be effective. We strongly disagree and find this objection borderline
illogical.
We concede that evaluating cyber risks posed by a particular
applicant, and pricing premiums in light of those risks, can be difficult.
But the difficulty exists whether this is done in the context of selling a
broad-based policy (e.g., all-risk property, CGL, automobile,
homeowners) or a stand-alone cyber-risk policy. The same underwriting
and pricing that necessarily attends sale of a cyber policy can simply be
incorporated into sale of a broader, more comprehensive, core policy.
59. See 2 KNUTSEN & STEMPEL, supra note 3, § 14.01.
60. See id.
61. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Assessing the Coverage Carnage: Asbestos Liability
and Insurance After Three Decades ofDispute, 12 CoNN. INS. L.J. 349, 417 (2006).
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Narrow, targeted policies may take on less risk but they also do not
spread risk by type (although they do spread risk among a pool of
policyholders). Regulators recognize this by giving closer scrutiny to the
solvency of mono-line insurers compared to multi-line insurers.
The true logic of insurance posits that insurers make money when
they are prudent in their underwriting (e.g., not selling policies to
suspicious persons or entities engaged in very difficult risks) and pricing
(e.g., charging an adequate premium even if this means losing sales to
some prospective insurers who are highly (perhaps unduly) price
62
sensitive). A broad scope of coverage is feasible and can be profitable
if priced appropriately: A techno-neutral approach to policy
interpretation will help to spur the market towards such a solution by
prompting the skittish insurer to draft with an eye to avoiding the pitfalls
of techno-centric drafting.
More comprehensive coverage may even reduce the insurer's risk
by diversifying the risk. A limited-risk insurer could be devastated if the
limited risk becomes a reality because the limited-risk policy was priced
entirely on an insulated risk. By contrast, a more broad-based policy that
is priced accordingly has risk diversification for the insurer. A given
policy year may see unexpectedly high cyber claims-but is unlikely to
also see unexpectedly high product liability or trespass or advertising
injury claims. Yet the policy was priced based on its comprehensive
commitment to coverage that provided the insurer with more premium
dollars for investment.
As the example of the CGL policy-which was first widely
available in 194163-illustrates, broad, bundled coverage can benefit
both insurers and policyholders. This, in turn, benefits victims through
more available compensation and society at large through enhanced
62. Warren Buffett, the CEO of Berkshire Hathaway ("Berkshire"), is one of the
world's richest people. Although Berkshire is best known for (shirts, of course) its
consumer brands such as Dairy Queen, Berkshire's primary business is insurance through
its subsidiaries like General Re, National Fire & Marine Insurance Company, and
National Indemnity Company. In nearly every one of his famous annual letters to
shareholders, which have become staples of the business press, Buffett attributes the
success of these insurers (and Berkshire generally) to having sufficient underwriting
discipline. See, e.g., Annual Letter from Warren Buffett, Chairman of the Bd., Berkshire
Hathaway, Inc., to the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. 8-13 (Feb. 25, 2017),
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/20161tr.pdf. Buffett prides himself on his
insurers' refusal to write business if it cannot be done at an adequate price. Further, as the
experience of other insurers has shown, investment income can often compensate for
underwriting loss stemming from underpricing.
63. See 2 STEMPEL& KNUTSEN, supra note 3, §14.01.
678 [Vol. 122:3
TECHNO-NEUTRALITY SOLUTION
socioeconomic stability.64 The 80-year history of the CGL policy shows
the feasibility of a similar approach to cyber-related risk and loss.
Of course, the easiest solution is to have insurers simply remove
exclusions for cyber losses. That would make current policies cyber
neutral and, thus, far more streamlined and easier and cheaper to police.
But, as mentioned, in the short-term, insurers can enjoy the fruits of a
textualist bench now and then by avoiding coverage under this exclusion.
That success may well be short-lived, as it only takes one court to "peek"
at what is actually going on with the operation of that exclusion before it
is read restrictively-or is read out of the policy altogether-as being
incongruous with the broad coverage grant and the reasonable
expectations of a modern policyholder.
We prefer a market-based solution to the present scope of cyber-
loss coverage gaps or, if such is not forthcoming, a market-based
solution prompted by courts taking a techno-neutral stance to the
interpretation of policy terms covering cyber losses.
While we recognize there may well be some interest in having
governmental regulation in the short- to medium-term to help stabilize
the coverage landscape for policyholders,65 we are confident that the
simple pressures of a shift in interpretive approach are enough incentive
for insurers to broaden the coverage horizon through simple, targeted
revisions to their policies (or alternatively, simple, targeted revisions to
courts' coverage decisions).
As noted, we have seen the insurance market respond to new risk
opportunities before and these responses fit the current pattern that is
64. See Erik S. Knutsen, Auto Insurance as Social Contract: Solving Automobile
Coverage Disputes Through a Public Regulatory Framework, 48 ALTA. L. REV. 715,
716-17, 740-51 (2011) (discussing how insurance coverage issues like auto insurance
coverage disputes can be better solved by looking at auto insurance as a "public
regulatory document with a public purpose," whereby the mandatory nature of auto
insurance is akin to a "social contract" with society); Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance
Policy as Social Instrument and Social Institution, 51 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1489, 1494-
98 (2010) (noting the importance of insurance to business operations, construction,
lending, compensating injured persons, and providing support for development
generally).
65. See, e.g., Angela Yu, Note, Let's Get Physical: Loss of Use of Tangible Property
as Coverage in Cyber Insurance, 40 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 229, 253-54
(2014) (positing that the government may have a role in either mandating cyber insurance
coverage or in financially contributing to the current gaps in cyber-loss coverage, until
the market is more sustained); see also Kesan & Hayes, supra note 17, at 273-76
(canvassing possibilities for government involvement in cyber-loss insurance); Lance
Bonner, Note, Cyber Risk: How the 2011 Sony Data Breach and the Need for Cyber Risk
Insurance Policies Should Direct the Federal Response to Rising Data Breaches, 40
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 257, 274-77 (2012) (arguing that the federal government should
become more involved in expanding the cyber risk market, as data breaches have become
a more pressing problem).
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unfolding. To add an additional layer of regulatory uncertainty to the mix
would only serve to warp the genesis of the next generation of policies
that are destined to provide standard coverage for the plethora of cyber
losses facing policyholders today.
Rather than go so far as to mandate (by statute or otherwise)
separate coverage 66 for cyber losses for large institutions like hospitals,
banks, and Fortune 500 companies, 67 we think a simpler solution is to
incorporate the coverage into pervasive standard insurance product lines:
CGL and commercial property policies, as well as homeowners policies.
This can be largely accomplished by a techno-neutral interpretive move
in the short- to medium-term. The underwriting effects of such a move
would of course have to be sorted out (and costed out) by the providing
insurance carriers; however, it is the least intrusive means that still places
control of coverage and product pricing in the hands of insurers without
necessarily binding the market into an artificially (and inefficiently)
segmented world of cyber and non-cyber coverage.
As a corollary, we are not ready to give up regulatory compliance
68
control of cyber losses to the insurance industry either. Using insurance
as an incentive for good cyber-loss risk management produces some
questionable results and places a great deal of influence and
responsibility on an industry whose incentives are about controlling
underlying financial risk to themselves, not necessarily buttressing the
societal interests of loss prevention beyond the insurable sphere of a
particular insurance policy. The necessary checks and balances for
reliable, neutral behavior regulation by insurers are absent in this context,
as evidenced by the Cottage Health Systems case discussed above, in
which insurance coverage for cyber losses was contingent on
policyholders adhering to particular data management standards set by
insurers (and, dare we say, "for" insurers).
An interpretive approach applying techno-neutrality as the short- to
medium-term solution may act as a solid market stabilizer instead of
introducing new, untested cyber-specific insurance products. It will at the
66. Whether as drop-down coverage, add-on endorsements to traditional policies, or
as separate policies altogether.
67. See Minhquang N. Trang, Note, Compulsory Corporate Cyber-Liability
Insurance: Outsourcing Data Privacy Regulation to Prevent and, Mitigate Data
Breaches, 18 MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH. 389, 389, 412-16 (2017).
68. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How
Insurance Reduces Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 205-13, 247-48 (2012)
(describing how insurers can modify policyholder behavior through ex ante coverage
requirements); Kesan & Hayes, supra note 17, at 268 ("Insurers are in a unique position
to push companies to adopt more consistently secure data-security practices . . . .");
Shauhin A. Talesh, Insurance Companies as Corporate Regulators: the Good, the Bad,
and the Ugly, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 463, 476 (2017) (describing how insurers can act as de
facto compliance managers for organizations dealing with cyber security threats).
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very least prompt courts to consider the compensatory gaps and coverage
nullification issues created as traditional and cyber lines either line up or
clash.

